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9 April 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
USSR-Berlin: Moscow's efforts to impress the West with its desire for further high-level talks on Berlin are reflected in recent Soviet overtures to restore normal relations between the US and Soviet commandants in Berlin. In his meeting with General Clarke on 5 April, Marshal Konev raised the issue of the Berlin commandants for formal discussion and later emphasized the need for a resolution of this problem in informal conversations. Konev asked specifically that his view be conveyed to General Watson, the US commandant in Berlin.

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
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Map Page

25X1 *Argentina: President Guido's government has decided to bar the successful Peronista candidates in the recent elections from taking office on 1 May on the assumption that this will not cause civil strife, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] The new minister of defense, Ernesto Lanusse, and military leaders reportedly believe that the Peronistas can be blocked--perhaps by decree--and that the general public is not interested in supporting extremist actions, such as the violence threatened by the Peronistas. These officials consider the police capable of preventing serious sabotage or demonstrations. [redacted] believes the danger of a return of Peronism is serving to unite diverse military elements in support of the Guido government. 25X1

[redacted] indicate that there is still confusion and uncertainty in the armed forces on what action to take if Guido fails to win political backing at home and acceptance abroad. Deposed President Frondizi sent an emissary to Brazil on 1 April to ask Foreign Minister Dantas to try to delay recognition of Guido, and Dantas agreed. 25X1

25X1 Ecuador: The outbreak of "guerrilla warfare" in the mountainous regions near Santo Domingo de los Colorados has been put down by Ecuadorean Army units, including some paratroops, after two days of sporadic fighting. The fighting was begun on 5 April by members of the pro-Castro Union of Young Revolutionaries (URJE) with arms and equipment allegedly smuggled in from Cuba. Santo Domingo is now reported to be calm, but to prevent further disturbances army and national police units are mobilized there and in other provincial towns--including Quevado, Esmeraldas, and Ambato--as well as in the main cities of Quito and Guayaquil.

The Ecuadorean Communist party (PCE) has used URJE groups in the past as street fighters in many urban demonstrations

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and riots, but thus far no direct Communist connection with the violence in Santo Domingo has been established. Military and civilian authorities have not hesitated to blame the Communists for the violence, however. The incident probably will add impetus to the military's demand that President Arosemena expel "the Communists" from his government.

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[redacted] (Map)

European Confederation: At his meeting with Italian Premier Fanfani in Turin on 4 April, De Gaulle is reported to have made "substantial concessions" on two of the three issues which have been blocking agreement on a treaty to establish a political union of the six Common Market (EEC) countries. According to French and Italian officials, De Gaulle agreed to modify articles of the draft treaty to assure that the union would not interfere with the operations of the EEC and to provide that common defense policies adopted by the union would "reinforce" NATO. On the third major issue--revision of the treaty after a transitional period--De Gaulle agreed to accept a clause stating that revision would be directed toward increasing European unity. He declined, however, to include specific reference to the manner in which this would be done.

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Italian officials are now incorporating the Turin "compromise" in a new draft to be presented to the other EEC countries, and they as well as the French are cautiously optimistic it will be acceptable. A French Foreign Ministry official believes that the statement concerning the article on revision which Britain is expected to make on 10 April will also help induce the proponents of a stronger union not to insist on defining their specific objectives at this time.

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Kenya: [The Kenya constitutional conference, which ended in London late last week, achieved a measure of agreement on some of the major issues it faced but made little headway in allaying the tribal tensions which are the biggest single obstacle to continued political advance. Two minor tribal groups which have been agitating for autonomy or independence refused to sign the agreement; moreover, neither of the two African parties was willing to accept the leader of the other group as chief minister, with the result that the British governor will head a coalition government composed of six members of each party. The details of the constitution are to be worked out at further talks in Nairobi, where the pressure of tribal animosities will tend to raise the tempers and harden the positions of the negotiators. Colonial Secretary Maudling has set 31 July as the deadline for the end of these talks, and the intervening period seems likely to see a steady rise in tension.]

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Ruanda-Urundi: [Retention of Belgian troops in this trust territory following its anticipated independence 1 July is becoming a major controversial issue. Most of the Europeans--largely Belgians--plan to leave before 1 July because they fear that the untrained local security forces or even such Belgian units as may be permitted to remain would not be able to maintain law and order. The five-member UN commission--Liberia, Morocco, Togo, Haiti, and Iran--appointed to study the local problems and report back to the General Assembly in June has increased local tension by emphasizing that the UN resolution calls for the withdrawal of all Belgian troops except training personnel as soon as possible. The commission, which reportedly blames Belgium for all troubles in the trust territory, plans to recommend that other African states furnish military advisers and training staffs to hasten the Belgian military exodus. The commission is now in Addis Ababa to hold meetings with Ruanda and Urundi spokesmen.]

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Situation Report--Uganda: Three groups are currently competing for power in the British protectorate of Uganda, and a climate of instability seems likely until well after independence, which is now scheduled for 9 October. Prime Minister Kiwanuka's Democratic party (DP), which gets most of its support from Uganda's Catholics, is in office because tribal traditionalists who support the king of the key province of Buganda boycotted the last elections, thereby permitting Kiwanuka's candidates to sweep the province. The traditionalists are now participating in politics and are almost certain to deprive the DP of all its seats in Buganda, in the protectorate elections scheduled for 25 April, although the Catholic vote elsewhere in Uganda will still give it a strong voice in the legislature. The Buganda traditionalists are joined in a shaky alliance with the Uganda People's Congress, the only major group which is organized on radical African nationalist lines. This alliance seems not likely to last, and the prospect is for a series of ineffective coalitions, with each of the three groups trying to manipulate the tribal and political sources of tension to its own advantage. [REDACTED] (Backup, Page 3)

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Soviet Overtures to Restore Normal Relations Between
Berlin Commandants

[Personal contacts between General Watson and General Solovyev, the US and Soviet commandants in Berlin respectively, were suspended in late December when East German authorities, with Soviet backing, refused to permit the US commandant to cross the East - West Berlin sector border when accompanied by civilian aides unless the latter showed their documentation to the East Germans--a move which would have implicitly recognized East German "sovereignty" in the Soviet sector. Subsequently, inconclusive discussions were held between the UK and Soviet commandants in an attempt to resolve the impasse. On 30 January, the UK commandant informally proposed that full freedom of movement for the commandants be restored.]

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[During his 5 April visit to Spandau prison in the British sector of Berlin, which is one of the few remaining quadripartite institutions in the city, the Soviet commandant's political adviser "unofficially" proposed that General Watson and General Solovyev meet on "neutral" ground, possibly at UK headquarters. The Soviet aide said he was "sure" that some agreement could be reached at such a meeting, which would provide that the US commandant's car and occupants, civilian or military, would not be subject to any checks at the Berlin border.]

[The Soviet aide's remarks are along the lines of the earlier British proposal and reflect his conversation of 15 March with a US official, in which he urged that the matter be settled by the two commandants concerned, suggesting, however, that it would be up to General Watson to make concessions. At that time, the Soviet political adviser indicated that the USSR would make no concession on the general issue of East German authority on the sector border; he suggested that the US commandant could communicate with the East German Interior Ministry to make arrangements to bring civilian aides with him across the sector border.]

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Ecuador

The URJE and the PCE both opposed the 2 April break in diplomatic relations with Cuba. Echoing Castro's charges that President Arosemena was "another Frondizi" bowing to military pressure, both threatened to hold violent demonstrations in Quito and Guayaquil. In the face of obvious military readiness to crush any such demonstrations, however, and probably fearful of arrest, the leaders of both groups fled from the cities during the week.

Resolutions of the seventh party congress of the PCE, held in March, called for abandonment of "peaceful" political action to gain power in Ecuador and outlined a plan for armed insurrection "of the Castro type" to harass and overthrow the government. Lack of efficient organization in the PCE seemed to preclude an effective campaign of guerrilla warfare, however, as did the difficulty of obtaining sufficient arms and materiel for a prolonged open struggle.

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Military success in quashing the violence in Santo Domingo, and vigilance in Quevado and other suspected centers of "revolt," probably will lead to a wholesale roundup of Communists and URJE members, and the PCE may be outlawed again. Stronger military pressure may also be brought on Arosemena to expel "Communists" from his government. Arosemena has already fulfilled the military's other major demand by breaking with Cuba. Although the military has not yet identified those it wants removed from the government, Arosemena probably is not in a position to resist a demand to fire anyone the military may name. Continued agitation by disgruntled leftists, and probably more violence, can be expected.

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Situation Report: Uganda

[With only a small white population and with a relatively well-developed native economy, Uganda has major problems different from those that have faced other British territories in east Africa. Britain has been trying for years to lead it into independence, but London's efforts have always run afoul of tribal particularism, which has been perpetuated in part by treaties concluded between London and the various native principalities around the turn of the century. Buganda is the largest, most important, and most recalcitrant of these; without Buganda, Uganda would not be politically or economically viable. For years the Kabaka (King) of Buganda has been waging a stubborn and effective campaign to retain the province's autonomy and his own authority.]

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[At a conference in London last October, the Kabaka and his followers, who had been boycotting protectorate politics for nearly a year, agreed to a constitution which called for independence on 9 October 1962. Under the constitution, Buganda is to have a special relationship with the rest of the country. This has aroused the jealousy of the other principalities--Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro, and Busoga--which have demanded equal treatment. Buganda, which wants to maintain its unique status and also realizes that its revenues probably would be used to support local governments elsewhere, recently told the British Government that any change in the status of the other areas would reopen the whole constitutional question, thereby delaying Uganda's accession to independence. The Kabaka, a stubborn negotiator in the past, probably would threaten to secede if he felt Buganda was being slighted in any way, either by the British or by other African elements in Uganda.]

[The Kabaka's traditionalist followers are amalgamated in a movement called the Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka Alone), which swept the Buganda provincial elections last February. The strengths of this movement, the Democratic party, and the Uganda People's party are more or less evenly balanced in the]

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protectorate as a whole, and a coalition will thus be necessary after the April elections. Since the three groups have widely divergent interests--almost the only thing they have in common is a desire to get in power--any coalition will be formed on the basis of pure expedience. No government formed under such circumstances is likely to be effective in combating the various tribal, political, and religious tensions. These tensions have frequently produced violence in the past, and widespread outbreaks might lead Britain to postpone the independence date. If London holds to its present schedule, on the other hand, even more serious violence could occur after British control is removed.

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Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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The Atomic Energy Commission

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